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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF MORALITY:
SODOMY LAW REFORM IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
Gina M. Smith* and Heidi Norton"

L

INTRODUCION

On September 14, 1993, the District of Columbia successfully reformed the
sodomy law with which it has been burdened for nearly two centuries. This reform
appears at first glance to have been a major victory, not only for the lesbian and
gay residents of the District for whom the law represented the greatest threat, but
also for proponents of the principles of self-governance. But the road to this victory
was a long and difficult one, spanning many decades and testing the outer limits of
thd tenets of Home Rule and Congressional oversight of District affairs.
This article sets forth the history of the sodomy law in the District of Columbia,
from the adoption of Maryland's common law in 1801, through codification, the
District's attempt to reform the law, and the Congressional veto of that attempt, to
the successful reform last year. But the history of the sodomy law in D.C. is made
particularly interesting by the moral issues it embodied, and by the ramifications
these issues had on the ability of the District to govern itself.
For many decades, Congress has assumed the role of guardian and final arbiter
of morality in the District of Columbia. Time and time again, Congress has used
D.C.'s criminal laws to define and control what is moral and acceptable for its
citizens, with little or no regard for the expressed wishes of District residents
themselves. Instead, Washington, D.C., as the Nation's Capital, has been used by
members of Congress as a political pawn in their moral posturing, to send a
symbolic message to their constituencies, to the nation, and to the world.
We focus on D.C.'s sodomy law as an excellent illustration of Congress'
determination to control morality in the District. To this end, we will show the
unusual lengths to which some members of Congress stretched the prescribed
limits of Congressional oversight, in order to proclaim jurisdiction over the moral
* Gina M. Smith is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at the District of Columbia School of Law.
She is the Domestic Partner of Heidi Norton. She extends her heartfelt thanks to her research assistant.
Henry A. Escoto. for the invaluable time, effort and energy he lent to this project.
** Heidi Norton is a Staff Attorney at the National Center for Law and Deafness in Washington. D.C.
She is the Domestic Partner of Gina M. Smith.
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climate of the District. We will show that as the battle over control of this emblem
of morality waged on, the District government and citizenry seized control of the
issue to the best of their ability, by restricting enforcement of the sodomy law on a
local level.
During the thirteen years in which Congress obstructed the District's efforts to
reform its prohibition against consensual sodomy, the community of the District
moved beyond mere consideration of criminal laws and created civil legislation to
address the.rights of lesbians and gay men. Among the most important of these
measures were the D.C. Human Rights Act' and the Health Benefits Extension
Act of 1992 ("Domestic Partnership Act").' Once again, the District government
had taken steps to circumvent Congress' obstacles by introducing civil legislation
minimizing the effects of the sodomy law and extending protections to those most
adversely affected by it.
The Domestic Partnership Act proposed to entitle same-sex couples to proclaim
themselves "Domestic Partners", and to accrue health benefits as such on a par
with married heterosexual couples. Congress seized this opportunity to make new
and forceful appeals in the name of national morality, ostensibly on behalf of the
residents of the District of Columbia. During this same period of time, the District
mounted another assault on the sodomy law, and this time Congress did not
interfere. Instead, Congress concentrated on keeping tight control over D.C.'s
finances, in order to frustrate any hope of the District enacting its own protections
for Domestic Partners.
In this sense, Domestic Partnership legislation appears to be heading down the
same path that sodomy law once travelled. Congress has seemingly resolved once
again to micro-manage the District's moral laws, this time focusing on a civil
aspect of the issue. Already, the District government and its citizens appear to be
poised to do all they can, on a local level, to exert self control on the issue of
Domestic Partnership. But a victory on the scale of reform of the sodomy law
seems remote. D.C. residents should therefore celebrate the demise of the
District's sodomy law and take aggressive measures to push forward civil rights for
Domestic Partners, while realizing that Congressional control is still a major
obstacle to the District's ability to set its moral agenda.

1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 et seq. (§ 6-2201; Dec. 13, 1977, D.C. Law 2-38, title I, § 101) (1987
and Supp. 1989).
2. D.C CODE ANN. § 36-104 et seq. (D.C. Law 9-114, § 2, 39 D.C. Reg. 2861).
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FORMATION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND How IT CAME To HAVE ITS
LAWS

The District of Columbia was created in 1788, when the state of Virginia3 and
the state of Maryland" each ceded ten square miles to the United States, for the
purpose of establishing a permanent seat for the federal government.
In 1801, Congress declared that the territory ceded to the United States by
Virginia, known as the County of Alexandria, District of Columbia, would be
governed by the common laws of Virginia, and that the territory ceded to the
United States by Maryland, known as the County of Washington, District of
Columbia, would be governed by the common law of Maryland.' Forty-five years
later, in recognition of the fact that the land ceded by Virginia had not been and
was not likely to be necessary for the purpose of housing the federal government,
Congress retroceded the county of Alexandria back to Virginia.' Congress
reaffirmed in 1901 the continued effect of the common law of Maryland as it had
7
existed at the time of its adoption in 1801, except as modified in the interim.

III CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE DIS RICT'S LEGISLATION

In 1973, Congress adopted the "District of Columbia Self-Government and
Government Reorganization Act" ("Home Rule" Act), which gave District voters
3. Act of Cession From the State of Virginia (described as "An Act for the Cession o Ten Miles
Square, or any Lesser Quantity of Territory Within This State, to the United States, in Congress Assembled,
for the Permanent Seat of the General Government.") (Birch's Digest. p.213). Reprinted in D C CODE ANNVol. I p. 32 (1981).
4. Act Authorizing Cession From State of Maryland (described as "An Act to Cede to Congress a
District of Ten Miles Square in This State for the Seat of the Government of the United States.") (Birch's
Digest. p. 213), Reprinted in DC CODE ANN Vol. 1. p. 33 (1981).
5. "The Organic Act of 1801" (ch. 15. 2 Stat. 103, 1801) Reprinted in DC CODE AN, 46 (1981).
("Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled. That the laws of the state of Virginia, as they now exist, shall ba and
continue in force in that part of the District of Columbia, which was ceded by the said state to the United
States. and by them accepted for the permanent seat of government: and that the laws of the state of
Maryland, as they now exist, shall be and continue in force in that pan of the said district, which was
ceded by that state to the United States, and by them accepted as aforesaid.)
6. An Act of Retrocession of County of Alexandria (described as "An Act to Retrocede the County of
Alexandria, in the District of Columbia, to the State of Virginia") (ch. 35, 9 Stat. 35, 1846) Reprinted in D C
CODE ANN. Vol. 1 p. 72 (1981).
7. D.C. CODE ANN § 49-301, (ch. 854, 31 Stat. 1189. 1901) (1981).
8. D.C. CODE ANN § 1-175 (1981); 87 Stat. 774 (1973).
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the right to elect their own City Council. 9 The powers of the City Council were
subject to a great many limitations, 0 but the only one dealing with activities
exclusively within the District and affecting only District residents was the
restriction on criminal law reforms, including a forty-eight month total prohibition

9. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-201 (1981) provides:
(a) Subject.to the retention by Congress of the ultimate legislative authority over the nation's capital
granted by article I, s 8, of the Constitution, the intent of Congress is to delegate certain legislative
powers to the government of the District of Columbia; authorize the election of certain local officials by
the registered qualified electors in the District of Columbia; grant to the inhabitants of the District of
Columbia powers of local self-government; modernize, reorganize, and otherwise improve the
governmental structure of the District of Columbia; and to the greatest extent possible, consistent with
the constitutional mandate, relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon essentially local District
matters.
It is worth noting that Congress intended to implement the recommendations of the Commission charged
with recommending changes in the District government with or without District voter approval. See Id. § 1201 (b).
10. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233 (1981) provides:
(a) The Council shall have no authority to pass any act contrary to the provisions of this Act except as
specifically provided in this Act, or to:
(1) Impose any tax on property of the United States or any of the several states;
(2) Lend the public credit for support of any private undertaking;
(3) Enact any act, or enact any act to amend or repeal any Act of Congress, which concerns the
functions or property of the United States or which is not restricted in its application exclusively in or to
the District;
(4) Enact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provision of Title II (relating to
organization and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts);
(5) Impose any tax on the whole or any portion of the personal income, either directly or at the
source thereof, of any individual not a resident of the District (the terms "individual" and "resident" to
be understood for the purposes of this paragraph as they are defined in § 47-1801.4);
(6) Enact any act, resolution, or rule which permits the building of any structure within the District
of Columbia in excess of the height limitations contained in § 5-504, and in effect on December 24, 1973;
(7) Enact any act, resolution, or regulation with respect to the Commission on Mental Health;
(8) Enact any act or regulation relating to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia or any other court of the United States in the District other than the District courts, or relating
to the duties or powers of the United States Attorney or the United States Marshal for the District of
Columbia; or
(9) Enact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provision of Title 23 (relating to criminal
procedure), or with respect to any provision of any law codified in Title 22 or 24 (relating to crimes and
treatment of prisoners), or with respect to any criminal offense pertaining to articles subject to regulation
under Chapter 32 of Title 22 during the 48 full calendar month immediately following the day on which
the members of the council first elected pursuant to this Act take office.
(b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as vesting in the District government any greater authority
over the National Zoological Park, the National Guard of the District of Columbia, the Washington
Aqueduct. the National Capital Planning Commission, or, except as otherwise specifically provided in this
Act, over any federal agency, than was vested in the commissioner prior to January 2, 1975.
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on changing any criminal law. 1 This prohibition illustrates Congress' reluctance to
relinquish control of the District."2
A.

How the Process Works

The new District City Council was afforded very little control over the laws
within its jurisdiction. In addition to prohibiting the enactment of any new
criminal laws for four full years, Congress also retained the indefinite right to
review City Council acts - within thirty days of adoption for civil acts,13 sixty
days for criminal acts. 4
In order for a law to be created in the District of Columbia, it essentially must
11. Id. § 1-233(a)(9).
12. The exclusion of the District's courts from City Council jurisdiction also showed that members of
Congress had very little regard for District residents' ability to discipline themselves.
13. Id. § 1-233(c)(1). This section provides:
Except acts of the Council which are submitted to the President in accordance with Chapter II of Title
31, United States Code, any act which the Council determines, according to § 1-229(a), should take
effect immediately because of emergency circumstances, and acts proposing amendments to title IV of
this Act and except as provided in § 47-322(c) and § 47-328(d)(1) the Chairman of the Council shall
transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President of the Senate, a copy of each
act passed by the Council and signed by the Mayor, or vetoed by the Mayor and repassed by two-thirds
of the Council present and voting, each act passed by the Council and allowed to become effective by the
Mayor without his signature, and each initiated act and act subject to referendum which has been ratified
by a majority of the registered qualified electors voting on the initiative or referendum. Except as
provided in paragraph (2). such act shall take effect upon the expiration of the 30-calendar-day period
(excluding Saturdays. Sundays, and holidays, and any day on which neither House is in session because
of an adjournment sine die. a recess of more than 3 days. or an adjournment of more than 3 days)
beginning on the day such act is transmitted by the Chairman to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate, or upon the date prescribed by such act, whichever is
later, unless during such 30-day period, shall be deemed to have repealed such act, as of the date such
resolution becomes law. The provisions of s 1-207. except subsections (d). (e). and (f) of such section,
shall apply with respect to any joint resolution disapproving any act pursuant to this paragraph.
14. Id. § 1-233(2). This section provides:
In the case of any such act transmitted by the Chairman with respect to any act codified in Title 22, 23.
or 24 of the District of Columbia Code, such act shall take effect at the end of the 60.day period
beginning on the day such act is transmitted by the Chairman to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate unless, during such 60-day period, there has been enacted
into law a joint resolution disapproving such act. In any case in %hich any such joint resolution
disapproving such act. In any case in which any such joint resolution disapproving such an act has, within
such 60-day period, passed both Houses of Congress and has been transmitted to the President, such
resolution, upon becoming law subsequent to the expiration of such 60-day period shall be deemed to have
repealed such act. as of the date such resolution becomes law. The provisions of § 1-207. relating to an
expedited procedure for consideration of joint resolutions, shall apply to a joint resolution disapproving
such act as specified in this paragraph.
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go through three legislative bodies. The initial part of the process is much like that
of any other legislative body in the United States. First, the City Council votes a
bill up or down. Once approved it is either signed by the Mayor, allowed to
become law without the Mayor's signature, or vetoed.1 5 After the bill has been
adopted, it must then be transmitted simultaneously to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the President of the Senate. 6 It is after this transmittal
that the Congressional review period begins to run. The thirty or sixty days (for
civil and criminal laws, respectively) are not calendar days, but days Congress is
actually in session.1 7 As a result, an act passed by the D.C. City Council can
actually be under Congressional review for many months.
During this review period, acts are referred to the Committees on the District of
Columbia of each House. 18 Either house has the right to veto the proposed
legislation by passing a resolution disapproving the act.19
B. How CongressionalReview is Meant to be Limited
The scope of Congressional review is not meant to be unlimited. The stated
purpose of Home Rule is to "relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon
essentially local District matters.12 0 Congress has articulated for itself three
criteria for vetoing acts adopted by the D.C. City Council:
1. Has an action of the city exceeded the powers granted to it under the
Home Rule Act? . . .2. Has the city, on the face of any act, clearly violated
any constitutional principle? .. . 3. Has the city interfered in a Federal

question or obstructed the Federal interest.2"
Under the first prong of this test, a simple reading of the limits on City Council

15. Id. § 1-233(c)(1), (c)(2).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-207 (1981). 87 Stat. 816 (1973) 98 Stat. 1837, 1984 (1973).
19. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(c)(1) and (c)(2), supra note 10, require "a joint resolution disapproving
such act." However, the House of Representatives repeal of Act 4-69, the 1981 Act, infra note 105, was held
effective as a one house veto. United States v. Langley. 112 D.W.L.R. 801 (D.C. Super. Ct. April 23, 1984).
But see Gary v. United States, 499 A.2d 815 (D.C. 1984) (One House veto provision of Home Rule Act
unconstitutional under U.S. Const. Art. I).
20. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-201(a) (1981).
21. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing and Disposition on H. Res. 208, before the Committee on
the District of Columbia, 97th Congress 1st Session (statement of Ronald V. Dellums (D.- Calif), Chairman.
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power contained in D.C. Code Ann. section 1-233 can readily determine whether
the granting authority has been exceeded. These limits contain no restriction on
the content of criminal laws or moral issues. Violations of the second prong of the
test should be determined by a court, not by a legislative body such as Congress.
The last prong of the test, concerning "Federal questions," can only be understood
to relate to criminal laws and laws affecting moral issues by twisting the
interpretation of "Federal interest" to include anything that makes a statement to
the nation and the rest of the world about what the United States stands for.
C.

How Questions of Morality Invade These Limitations

In practical terms, the limits of this three-pronged test for Congressional
oversight of District affairs has been stretched and weakened to justify any and all
interference by Congress, at its pleasure. Most often, when District legislation
affecting criminal or moral matters has prompted Congress' concern, the need for
Congressional oversight has been propounded on the theory that such matters
affect the Federal interest.
Indeed, the test has become less one of whether the District has "obstructed"
the Federal interest, than, whether it has asserted its will within its jurisdiction on
a matter in which the rest of the nation is also interested. Representative Thomas
Bliley (R-Va.) captured the reasoning behind the diminution of this standard
during the hearings on the District's 1981 attempted reform of the sodomy law,
when he stated:
I think this clearly falls within category 3, the Federal interest. This city is
our Nation's Capital and to it come visitors from all over the world, thousands
of them every year, and these laws, particularly the sexual laws, could have an
effect on them and on our national image as well."'
Legal scholars have called attention to Congress' tendency to use the issues
reflected in D.C.'s legislation as an opportunity to grandstand to a national
audience from a particular moral perspective . 5 Congress views District laws as

22. See U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing and Disposition on H. Res. 208 before the Committee
on the District of Columbia, 97th Congress, 1st Session (statement of Ronald V. Dellums, Chairman).
23. See infra Section VII.
24. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing and Disposition on H. Res. 208, before the Committee on
the District of Columbia (1981) (statement of Rep. Thomas Bliley (R-Va.)).
25. Louis M. Seidman, The Preconditionsfor Home Rule, 39 CATim. U. L REv. 373 (1990).
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providing an optimal context in which to address moral issues, because its
members can gain high marks from the conservatives within their constituencies,
while not affecting the rights of the liberals in their own jurisdictions." °
D. The Nexus Between a Jurisdiction's Control of its Criminal Laws and its
Control of its Own Morality
The content of a community's criminal laws has long been recognized to be a
reflection of that community's moral values.17 The behaviors that the citizenry
decides should be discouraged are declared crimes and are subject to
punishment. 2 8 Once an individual has committed an act declared by the
community to be inappropriate, members of that group have the opportunity to
decide if and how the offender will be punished. This concept of being judged by
one's peers has evolved into the modem-day jury trial.2 Yet there is a difference
between morality and crime:
Morality is concerned with intent, regardless of whether it is accompanied by
an act. Crime, however, requires that intent be accompanied by a wrongful
act.8 0

Congressional grandstanding on issues like homosexual rights in the District is obviously intended for
national consumption. It offers members of Congress a free vote on morality issues to satisfy vociferous
local constituencies. . . It would be bad enough if District residents were being governed by an entity
over which they lacked control. But they are not so much being governed as being made an example of.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
26. Philip G. Schrag, District of Columbia: The "State" of Controversy, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 311 at
n.I
1 (1990).
27. Leon Pearl, A Case Against the Kantian Retributivist Theory of Punishment: A Response to
Professor Pugsley, II HOFSTRA L. REV. 273 (1982); Ronald Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A
Further Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299 (1990); James J.
Gobert, The Fortuity of Consequence, 4 Crim. L. F. I (1993).
28. See Rychlak, supra note 27.
29. See Gobert, supra note 27. Members of the community of the District of Columbia did decide at
times not to punish defendants in consensual sodomy prosecutions. See discussion of jury nullification, Infra
note 126. Trial judges were another part of the community who declined to punish by dismissing charges in
consensual sodomy prosecutions. United States v. Buck, 342 A.2d 48 (D.C. 1975) ("This is but the most
recent of a series of cases in which this court has been urged to hold that § 22-3502 (defining the crime of
sodomy and making conduct so defined a felony) cannot constitutionally or [sic] be applied to acts described
therein when performed by mutually consenting adult males. This court has repeatedly rejected this
proposition.") (citations omitted).
30. Rychlak, supra note 27, at 330 (citations omitted).
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As this article will show, Congressional debates about the District of Columbia's
criminal laws demonstrate that this nation's representatives are most concerned
with imposing their own notions of morality and acceptable behavior upon the
residents of D.C. Repeatedly, a majority in Congress has voted to send a symbolic
message to the country discouraging homosexual activity, rather than enabling the
District to mete out fair punishment to individual offenders according to the wishes
of the community.
For decades, the District of Columbia was saddled with a criminal law that it
did not choose to adopt, and had indeed decided to repeal. The residents of the
District no longer chose to bear the financial and administrative burdens associated
with punishing defendants prosecuted under the sodomy law, 1 and in 1981 they
declared through their elected representatives that consensual sodomy among
adults was no longer inappropriate behavior. As Congress' discussion of that
legislation, and its veto of the District's reform initiative, showed a majority of its
members believe that the community of the District of Columbia is larger than the
group of people who elect members to the City Council. The community of the
District of Columbia, for them, includes all citizens of the fifty states of the United
States. Thus, Congress continues to define what is acceptable in the District of
Columbia by the standards of Virginia, Louisiana, and Illinois.
IV. How

A.

THE DiSicr

OF COLUMBIA CAME TO HAVE rrs SODOMY L4w

Sodomy Was A Crime At Common Law In Maryland

The act of sodomy had been a crime at common law in Maryland.3 2 By
incorporation, therefore, sodomy became part of the common law of the District in
1801.

31. Congress did not give the District citizens the right to make prosecutorial decisions o(wer felonies.
That discretion lies with the US. Attorney. See infra note 33. The financial burdens include police
investigations and processing of cases, also the cost to jurors in lost work time %hile observing trials. The City
recognized the costs associated with police actions in consensual sodomy cases. See Infra note 126. This of
course does not include the cost and burden on citizens who participate in those acts and the effects of having
their activities declared unacceptable by the community. Discrimination against lesbians and gay men has
been the result of criminal sodomy laws, regardless of whether they apply equally to heteroseual activity.
32. Davis v. State. 3 H. & J. 154 (Md. 1810).
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The United States Attorney's Initiative

In 1948, the United States Attorney's office, which has prosecutorial authority
in D.C. over most felonies,"a initiated a bill to broaden and clarify certain sex
crimes under the common law. 3 4 Among the U.S. Attorney's primary goals in
codifying the sex crimes of the District were: the clarification of several
ambiguities; 8 the significant expansion of penalties when children were involved;30
the addition of several locations where the crime of "invitation" could occur; 87 and
the inclusion of a provision allowing repeat offenders (who were referred to as
"sexual psychopaths") to be treated at Saint Elizabeth's Hospital, instead of
simply being sentenced to ninety days' imprisonment. 38
C. The 1948 Sexual Psychopaths Bill

The legislation presented to Congress for hearings in 1948 was described as "A
33. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-101(c) (1981) (July 29, 1970,84 Stat. 604, Pub. L. 91-358, title II. § 210(a):
1973 Ed., § 23-101.).
34. Hearing on H. R. 6071 before the United States Senate Judiciary Subcommittee of the Committee
on the District of Columbia. 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1948), "To Provide for the Treatment of Sexual
Psychopaths in the District of Columbia" [Hereinafter "1948 Hearings"]. Testimony of George Morris Fay,
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia:
Very briefly, Senator, the original reason for suggesting an amendment of some of the existing
statutes and the incorporation of a new statute to handle some of the sex offenses which my office has
been confronted with was the complaints that were coming in, particularly from the Juvenile Department
of the Metropolitan Police Department [D.C. Police].
They could not control some of the violations of the existing statutes by adults when perpetrated on
children, or by act perpetrated on children, and the provisions of some of the existing statutes for the type
of crime specified were not in proportion to those existing in other jurisdictions.
35. 1948 Hearings, supra note 34, at 7. Testimony of U.S. Attorney for D.C., Mr. Fay:
The common law has been interpreted by numerous cases and it left considerable vagueness with
respect to offer of proof on certain points there. They are specifically set forth in this statute to try to get
away from what were merely technicalities in trying to prosecute where you have an open and shut case.
36. 1948 Hearings, supra note 34, at 4. (Testimony of U.S. Attorney for D.C., Mr. Fay)
[Senator Kem: "Just what situation , or situations, do you want to reach?"]
"Principally, the strengthening of the law as it refers to sex offenses against children.".
37. 1948 Hearings, supra note 34, at 5-6. (Testimony of U. S. Attorney for D.C., Mr. Fay)
"That is the amendment there, sir, to include public buildings, public places, stores, shops or reservations.
or at any public gatherings or assemblies.".
38. 1948 Hearings, supra note 34, at 8-9. (Testimony of U.S. Attorney for D.C.. Mr. Fay)
It provides very briefly that if it comes to the attention of either the court or the district attorney that a
man is an habitual offender in sex cases ... and if it is determined that he is what is referred to as a sex
psychopath, he then, instead of being committed to jail, will be committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital
where they will try to treat him and cure him.
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Bill To Provide For the Treatment of Sexual Psychopaths In The District of
Columbia" ("Sexual Psychopaths Bill"). 30 Title I of the Act included four
sections, each addressing a different sexual behavior. Indecent exposure,' °
prostitution,' pedophilia 42, and sodomy' 3 were all to be codified as illegal activity.
The sodomy section of the bill was taken from the Maryland sodomy statute."
The purpose of including this section was to relieve some of the ambiguities
inherent in the common law definition of sodomy, which had caused prosecutorial
difficulties. For example, under common law, it was unclear whether sodomy per
os 45 was included in the definition of sodomy, and whether emission was a
6
necessary element of the crime.4
The bill purported to resolve these questions and to specify the acts to be
included within the definition of sodomy. 47 In addition, the law included a catch-all

39. H.R. 6071, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 346 (1948).
40. Id. at § 101.
41. Id. at § 102.
42. H.R. 6071, supra note 37, at § 103.
43. Id. at § 104.
44. MD. CODE ANN., Art. 27, § 578 (Flack, 1939). The Maryland sodomy statute is still in effect and
enforced. See Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176 (1990).
" '
Per " when so used means 'by' or 'by means ofr and the word 's' is the Latin meaning 'the
45.
mouth.'" English v. State, 164 So. 848 (Fla. 1935).
46. H.R. 6071, supra note 39, 80th Congress, 2nd Sess., Ch. 428 Senate Report No. 1377
(incorporating House Report No. 1787, to accompany H.R. 6071) "District of Columbia-Psychopaths"
Legislative History, p. 1717 [hereinafter "Legislative History~]. The definition of sodom) under the common
law was uncertain to many courts. See Lawrence R Murphy, Defining the Crime Against Nature- Sodomy in
the United States Appeals Courts, 1810-1940, 19(I) J. OF Hom1OSEXUAuTY 49 (1990).
47. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981). (ch. 428, 62 Stat. 347, 1948) provides:
(a) Every person who shall be convicted of taking into his or her mouth or anus the sexual organ of any
other person or animal, or who shall be convicted of placing his or her sexual organ in the mouth or anus
of any other person or animal, or who shall be convicted of having carnal copulation in an opening of the
body except sexual parts with another person, shall be fined not more than S1.000 or be imprisoned for a
period not exceeding 10 years. Any person convicted under this section of committing such act with a
pcrson under the age of 16 years shall be fined no more than S1,000 or be imprisoned for a period not
exceeding 20 years. And in any indictment for the commission of any of the acts, hereby declared to be
offenses, it shall not be necessary to set forth the particular unnatural or perverted sexual practice with
the commission of which the defendant may be charged, nor to set forth the particular manner in which
said unnatural or perverted sexual practice was committed, but it shall be sufficient if the indictment set
forth that the defendant committed a certain unnatural and perverted sexual practice with a person or
animal, as the case may be: Provided, that the accused, on motion, shall be entitled to be furnished with a
bill of particulars, setting forth the particular acts which constitute the offense charged
(b) Any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime specified in this section. Proof of
emission shall not be necessary.
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phrase, "unnatural and perverted sex practice," 48 as did the Maryland law. 4
D. The 1948 CongressionalHearings
In the Spring of 1948, the Sexual Psychopaths Bill was sent to the Committee
on the District of Columbia in each house of Congress. Senator James P. Kern
chaired the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee that presided over the hearings.
Among those who testified were George Morris Fay, U.S. District Attorney for the
District of Columbia; Vernon E. West, Corporation Counsel for the District of
Columbia; Representative Arthur L. Miller of Nebraska; George C. Ruhland,
Health Officer of the District of Columbia; and John M. Holzworth, an attorney in
Virginia. 50
During these hearings, Senator Kem questioned Mr. Fay about his objectives in
drafting and introducing this bill, and in including the various elements contained
therein. In responding to this question, Mr. Fay noted that the crime of sodomy
was included because it had existed at common law, and that the statute was
1
drafted to include all crimes that had existed at common law.
Mr. Fay's explanation for the inclusion of sodomy in the Sexual Psychopaths
Bill was the only one given during the hearings. 5a In fact, his was the sole
reference to the purpose of codifying any of the existing common law sex offenses,
other than those that were being modified or strengthened. There was neither
debate nor discussion concerning the merit of any of the common law sex offenses
that were to be codified. Neither was any suggestion made that, in addition to
having been crimes at common law, these offenses were considered criminal acts
by the population in D.C. at that time. Indeed, by the reasoning given by Mr. Fay,
had it been a sex crime at common law for a woman to kiss a man upon the cheek
in public, it presumably would have been codified in 1948 along with all the other

48. Id. § 22-3502(a).
49. MD. CODE ANN., Art. 27 § 578 (1939).
50. 1948 Hearings. supra note 34, at 1.
51. 1948 Hearings, supra note 34, at 6-7. Testimony of U.S. Attorney
for D.C., Mr. Fay:
Sodomy is covered by section 104, sir. As it exists today, sodomy is incorporated in the United States
District of Columbia coade [sic] by reason of the fact that it was a crime in common law, and we have
that all inclusive statute that any crime in common law is a crime under the District of Columbia code,
and is punishable by five years in prison.
52. Although information had been presented to the Senate Committee showing that there were several
ambiguities in the common law definition of sodomy which needed to be addressed, Mr. Fay did not raise this
matter during the hearings. See supra note 35.
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offenses. If any forethought went into the codification of D.C.'s sodomy law, it was
not apparent from the 1948 Congressional hearings. This proved significant
decades later, as the federal legislature fought with much fanfare to save the D.C.
sodomy law, investing it with great symbolism and significance, and particularly
striving to protect the District from the ravages of homosexuality5s
Little further discussion took place about the sodomy provision of the new bill,
save for the immensely important issue of its vagueness. Senator Kern took an
active role in bringing this matter to the forefront of discussion, several times
reiterating the question after witnesses had allowed the subject to be dropped." As
he framed this issue, there were two related problems with the definition of
sodomy. One was the lack of specificity or enumeration of the acts involved. The
other was the over-inclusiveness and indeterminateness of the phrase "any other
unnatural or perverted sex act." Senator Kern posed the following insightful
questions to the various witnesses:
Now, Doctor, I think you made one very interesting suggestion which strikes
me as being important, and that is this definition of sodomy. Do you think it is
too vague and indefinite to include in the definition of the crime the language
'who shall be convicted of committing any other unnatural or perverted sexual
act?' Do you think that leaves too wide a range for speculation? It looks like
it might well lead to a serious injustice being done. I do not have sufficient
knowledge of those practices to know just what would come under the
definition or what would not, but I can well see, as Dr. Ruhland suggests, that
somebody might do something that somebody would consider as unnatural or
perverted practice and which somebody else would not so consider."a
I would like to ask Dr. Miller what he thinks of Dr. Ruhland's comment on
the definition of the crime of sodomy. Are you of the impression that that idea

53.

It is interesting to note that no reference whatsoever was made during the 1948 hearings to

homosexuality, nor even to homosexual acts or practices.
54. 1948 Hearings, supra note 34.
Unfortunately, Senator Kern had the habit, within these hearings at least, of asking relevant and
important questions of those witnesses who were singularly unqualified to answer them. For example. he asked

Dr. Ruhland, a medical doctor, whether the definition of sodomy was too vague. Id. at 25. His question to
Representative Miller about whether the definition was too broad prompted the response from Representative
Miller that he was "just a physician," and knew more about that than about being a member of Congress. Id.
at 29.
55. Id. at 25 (Statement of Senator Kern to Dr. Ruhland).
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might give a court or a jury sort of a roving commission?
It seems to me, Dr. Miller, if you are going to send a man, or if you are going
to get the court to send a man to prison for ten years, the act should be pretty
definitely defined. For instance, I can see how there might be a difference of
opinion as to whether certain things such as necking or petting are unnatural
perverted acts may well be such in the opinion of some people, and in others,
not.

57

I think that lawyers would agree that a criminal statute should define a crime
with great precision and exactness. That is a fundamental proposition. 8
A variety of witnesses dispassionately discussed the degree to which the sodomy
provision should specify or enumerate the exact activities which would come within
the law. Representative Miller observed that some acts which were considered
"perverted" and "unnatural" were also quite commonly practiced. 9 Mr.
Holzworth testified that, in light of his experience as a former district attorney, he
was of the opinion that a number of acts fell within the grey area of the definition
of sodomy, giving the district attorney a wide range of prosecution.60 On the other
hand, Mr. West testified that, in his opinion, the terms "sodomy, ....
unnatural"
and "perverted" had adequately-understood meanings under common law, and
need not be further defined by the statute.61

56. Id. at 29 (Statement of Senator Kern to Rep. Miller).
57. Id. at 32 (Statement of Senator Kern to Rep. Miller).
58. Id. at 30 (Statement of Senator Kern to Rep. Miller).
59. Id. at 30.
Rep. Miller: "It says in line 25 of section 104: *...
of committing any other unnatural or perverted sexual
act.' What those acts might be is hard to say. I recall a number of cases that are perverted and unnatural and
which some people habitually carry on." Id.
60. Id. at 38-39.
(Testimony of Mr. Holzworth):
Now, I am thoroughly in agreement with the purposes of this law. I happen to be familiar with the
criminal law because I was formerly a district attorney, and I can cite a great many cases here in
Washington, but under the provisions of this Act, it gives the district attorney a most unusual and wide
range of prosecution for conduct which, in the mind of the district attorney a few minutes ago, falling
within the definition of sodomy. There you have a legally defined crime, but then there are certain
borderline cases that he could not state whether it came within the definition of sodomy. Id.
61. Id. at 30.
(Testimony of Mr. West):
It seems to me that these words have a pretty well defined meaning in the law, and I think (the definition
would be construed in the light of the common law as to the crime of sodomy. Id.
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The law "To Provide for the Treatment of Sexual Psychopaths in the District of
Columbia, and for other purposes," was adopted in 1948 ("Sexual Psychopaths
Statute").62 Very little had been done to resolve the issues of vagueness or
overbreadth raised during the Senate hearings, or to clarify the wording of the
statute in this regard.

V. THE EFFEcr OF THE 1948 SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHS STATUTE
Across the nation, sodomy laws have been used to justify the withholding of
other rights from homosexuals, and the District of Columbia's history has been no
exception. Although the definition of sodomy at common law and as enacted by
many states has included acts which are regularly practiced by heterosexuals and
homosexuals alike, in reality heterosexuals are rarely prosecuted for performing
consensual acts of sodomy in private. In fact, courts in many jurisdictions have
03
ruled that the law shall not be applied to heterosexuals.
To be sure, the mere existence of a sodomy law is often all that is necessary to
create a climate of hostility and discrimination against homosexuals in a variety of
contexts unrelated to the practices outlined or alluded to in the statutes." This
persists despite the fact that many homosexuals are abstinent, or make love in
ways that do not involve the statutorily-proscribed acts."8
Yet, for the simple "offense" of being homosexual, lesbians and gay men are
frequently excluded from full participation in society. Sodomy's felony status in
most states, and as an infamous crime at common law," have led to limitations in
00
a multitude of settings, including employment 07 and military service. Even
62. Pub. L. No. 615, Ch. 428, 62 Stat. 347 (1947) Reprinted In DC CODE AN. § 22-3502.
63. See Schochet v. State., 580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990) (Sodomy law no longer applies to consensual
conduct between heterosexuals.). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186. 106 S. CL 2841. 92 LEd.2d
140 (1986) (No right of privacy to engage in sodomy under the US. Constitution).
64. Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F.Supp 859 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (Employer was justified in withdrawing offer of
employment when prospective employee exercised her constitutional right to intimate association by planning
a marriage ceremony with a same-sex partner.).
65. Indeed, many behaviors common in lesbian lovemaking do not bring the participants within the
purview of sodomy laws. For an in-depth analysis of sodomy laws as they relate to the common sexual
practices of lesbians, see Ruthann Robson. Crimes of Lesbian Sex, in Lesbian (Out)Law- Survival Under the
Rule of Law (1992).
66. See LaGrange v. Hinton. 603 A.2d 1385 (Md. 1991) (Conviction for the infamous crime of sodomy
prevented man from serving as representative for his deceased mother's estate.).
67. See Norton v. Macy. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Homosexuality is "immoral" conduct, and as
such is grounds for dismissal rrom federal civil service.): Shahar v. Bowers. supra note 59 (Withdrawal of
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immigration laws are affected by sodomy statutes.60
The existence of a sodomy law on the books is most commonly raised in divorce
proceedings where one parent's sexual orientation is used to deny him or her
custody of a child." ° Often in these proceedings, the sexuality of the homosexual
parent is raised in order to infer, without actually showing, that she or he regularly
practices sodomy. By definition this makes the parent a felon, and by implication
she or he is then considered dangerous to the child.7 1 Like most other jurisdictions,
the District allows evidence of sexual orientation to be presented in custody
proceedings, although it should not be a determining factor.72

VI.

LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE

1948

SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHS STATUTE

The legal challenges to the 1948 statute underscore the problems with the
codification. Despite being offered as a means to clear up vagueness in the common
law, the statute only generated more questions, as became quite apparent by the
challenges by defendants. Reported opinions of such challenges fall mainly within

four major categories: vagueness; consent as a defense; equal protection/unequal
prosecution; and right to privacy.
offer of employment is allowed as a justifiable burden on prospective employee's right to intimate association
- religious marriage to a same sex partner - despite lack of evidence that a state law had been broken.). For
an in-depth examination of homosexuality and employment law, see Note, Employment Issues Affecting Gay
Men and Lesbians, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1554 (1989).
68. Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d. 1160 (9th Cir. 1991). There is evidence that courts are no longer giving
deference to the military's judgment that homosexual status is incompatible with military service. See,
Meinhold v. U.S. Department of Defense, 808 F.Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993), stay denied, 991 F.2d 808 (9th
Cir. 1993); Selland v. Aspin, et al., 832 F.Supp. 12, (D.D.C. 1993); Steffan v. Aspin, et al., 8 F.3d 57 (D.C.
Cir. 1993); Elzie v. Aspin, 841 F.Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1993).
69. Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Immigration statute which allows for
deportation of aliens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude would include consensual sodomy.).
70. See Wanda Wakefield, Initial Award or Denial of Child Custody to Homosexual or Lesbian
Parent,6 A.L.R.4th 1297 (1993). Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985); Bottoms v. Bottoms, (Henrico Co.,
Va. 1993) (Lesbian mother's having had oral sex was sufficient basis to remove custody of child, because oral
sex is a felony under state law).
71. Bottoms, supra note 70.
72. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911 (1981) 77 Stat. 561, 1963 provides:
(a) During the pendency of an action for divorce, or an action by the husband or wife -to declare the
marriage null and void, where the nullity is denied by the other spouse, the court may:
(5) determine who shall have the care and custody of infant children pending the proceedings, without
conclusive regard to the race, color, national origin, political affiliation, sex, or sexual orientation, In
and of itself, of a party. In determining the care and custody of infant children, the best interest of the
child shall be the primary consideration ...
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A.

Vagueness

Challenges based on vagueness were of two varieties - those questioning the
definition of sodomy, and those pertaining to the effect of the phrase, "unnatural
and perverted.-"
Uncertainties about the definition of sodomy and the effect of the phrase
"unnatural and perverted" were identified at the 1948 hearings. Senator Kern
realized that a number of injustices could result from failing to put the community
on notice about what activities would be punishable. Unfortunately, Congress did
not take the time to follow through and clear up these ambiguities.
A number of judges had difficulty determining which parts of the statute defined
the crime of sodomy. Opinions differed about whether the statute's various parts
constituted a definition and re-phrasing, or rather an enumeration of alternative
ways of committing the act of sodomy. Nor was there any agreement on whether
or not the statute provided an exhaustive list of the ways to commit the crime.7
One point of disagreement throughout a series of legal challenges to the statute
was the issue of whether or not cunnilingus was included within the definition of
sodomy. This question elicited more discussion then would seem warranted. On its
face, the statute appeared to include cunnilingus because it stated, "Every person
. ..taking into his or her mouth.
the mouth of any other person. . ."I

or. . .placing his or her sexual organ into
Clearly, the statute as written applied to oral

. .

sex acts performed on women's genitals. Nonetheless, in a challenge based on
equal protection, a defendant contended that a lesbian oral sex act would not be a
crime as defined by the statute. The D.C. Court of Appeals disagreed, ruling that
cunnilingus was sodomy under the statute.7
Despite this ruling the issue arose again in a later case, Roundiree v. United
States.7 Rather than simply citing the earlier case, Cozart, or noting the plain
language of the statute, the court also consulted the legislative history for
guidance. Inquiry into the legislative history of a statute would not ordinarily be
noteworthy, but in this opinion, the court looked to the phrase, "unnatural and

73.

See Cain v. United States, 532 A.2d 1001. 1005 (D.C. 1987) (-The grand jury need only to

conclude that appellant committed sodomy in one way of any number of alternative statutorily expressed or
implied ways . .."). The D.C. Court of Appeals ruled that there was only one crime, sodomy, which could be
committed in at least the three different ways listed. Id.
74. D.C CODE ANN § 22-3502(a). supra note 47 (emphasis supplied)
75. United States v. Cozart. 321 A.2d 342, 343 (D.C. 1974), (hereinafter -Cozart'1.
76. 581 A.2d 315 (D.C. 1990). [hereinafter -Roundtree".
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perverted" to show that more than anal sex was included 77 and that oral sex acts
performed on women were covered by the statute,78 despite the reference to
penetration in Section 22-3502(b). 79 The court concluded that Congress had
intended the codified definition of sodomy to exceed the common law definition. 0
Although this determination was correct, the court need not have relied upon the
phrase "unnatural and perverted" to reach this result, as Congress' intent to
expand the common law definition to include acts per os was clear from the
language of the statute.
Reliance on the phrase "unnatural and perverted" as evidence of an intent to
expand the codification beyond common law ignored both an earlier construction
of the statuite and the statement made by U.S. Attorney Fay during the 1948
hearings on the bill." One of the first challenges to the statute involved a man
convicted of sodomy and rape.8 2 The jury instructions on the sodomy charge were
merely a repetition of the rape charge, which alleged that the defendant had
committed an "unnatural and perverted sexual practice."8 3 The trial judge failed
to read to the jury the statute's definition of sodomy or to describe the elements of
that crime. 84 The defendant appealed, but his conviction was upheld.8 5
Judge Bazelon, concurring in the judgment on other grounds, noted that, by
failing to define the offense for the jury, the judge had violated one of the
principles of the jury system.8 6 The lower court's use of the indictment statement
as a jury instruction prevented the jury from deciding the case based on the facts
presented and the elements of the crime given in the statute.87 The purpose of the
"unnatural and perverted" language was to allow the prosecutor to continue the
common law practice of not alleging a specific act, thus the phrase should not have
77. Id. at 330 n. 38.
78. Roundtrec, supra note 76, at 330-331.
79. D C CODE ANN § 22-3502(b) "Any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime
specified in this statute .
80. Roundtree. supra note 76. at 330 n. 38.
81. See supra note 51.
82. McGuinn v. United States, 191 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1951), hereinafter "McGuinn".
83. Id. at 480 (Bazelon, J. concurring). The statute allows the [indictment to ". . . set] forth that the
defendant committed a certain unnatural and perverted sexual practice with a person or animal.
" DC
CODE ANN 22-3502(a), supra note 47. Stating with specificity the act committed was not necessary at
common law. See Lawrence R. Murphy, Defining the Crime Against Nature: Sodomy in the United States
Appeals Courts. 1810-1940. 19(1) J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 49 (1990).
84. McGuinn, supra note 82, at 480 (Bazelon, . concurring.)
85. Id.
86. McGuinn, supra note 82, at 480 (Bazelon. J. concurring) (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 480 (Bazelon, J. concurring).
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been read to expand the coverage of sodomy by "unnatural and perverted." Judge
Bazelon objected to the majority opinion's overbroad reading of the definition of
sodomy, stating:
The statute does not, however, make commission of 'a certain unnatural and
perverted sexual practice' a crime. The only acts declared to be offenses and
hence covered by the procedural provisions. . .are those defined in detail by
the first part of the statute .... 8
B. Equal Protection/UnequalProsecution
In United States v. Cozart, a male defendant was charged with solicitation of
another male for sex." As the defense understood the statute, it could not be
applied to two women who performed cunnilingus together. This reading of the
statute led to the defendant's argument that the statute was unconstitutional on its
face, because it could only be applied to the activities of two men, or of a man and
a woman, but not to those of two women, and that it therefore violated the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
The court ruled that the statute did indeed cover oral sex as practiced by two
women, and that it could therefore cover the crime of sex solicitation between
females. The court did recognize, however, that the complete absence of
prosecutions against women for this offense was likely due to ignorance on the part
of police and prosecutors.90
C. Right to Privacy
In the early 1970's there were a number of attempts to challenge the statute

88. Id. at 480 (Bazelon, J. concurring.) D C CODE AN- § 22-3502(a). supra note 47:
Every person who shall be convicted of taking into his or her mouth or anus the sexual organ of any other
person or animal, or who shall be convicted of placing his or her sexual organ in the mouth or anus of any
other person or animal, or who shall be convicted or having carnal copulation in an opening of the body
except sexual parts with another person, shall be fined not more than S1,000 or be imprisoned for a period
not exceeding ten years. Any person convicted under this section or committing such act with a person
under the age of sixteen years shall be fined not more than SI.000 or be imprisoned for a period not
exceeding twenty years.
89. 321 A.2d 342 (D.C. 1974).
90. Id. An expert witness testified at trial that there had been no arrests of females for solicitation to
commit sodomy from September 22. 1962 to July 20. 1973. Id. at 343
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under the newly-developed "zone of privacy" theory. This right had been
successfully articulated in the procreation rights cases. 91 Unfortunately, the
defendants who claimed this right in the sodomy context were accused of behavior
which had not taken place in private, thus, the defense was inapplicable.92
Likewise, sodomy which occurred in a commercial establishment was held to be
outside the scope of any right to privacy protection.9
D.

Consent As An Affirmative Defense

Not surprisingly, a number of defendants prosecuted under the sodomy statute
raised consent of the participants to the act as an affirmative defense. On its face,
the statute would not seem to allow consent as a defense, as it specifically
authorized prosecution for both the "placing" and the "taking" of a sexual organ
into the mouth or anus. 94 Thus, the statute clearly provided for the prosecution of
each or both parties to a consensual act of sodomy. However, consent was allowed
as an affirmative defense to a charge of assault with intent to commit sodomy. 0
Consent has never been ruled a defense to the statute in the District of
Columbia. 6

VII.

THE DISTRICr's ATTEMPTS TO REPEAL ITS SODOMY LAW

Beginning in the early 1980's, the City Council attempted to enact sweeping
reforms in the area of sex crimes. The "District of Columbia Sexual Assault
Reform Act of 1981" ("1981 Act") attempted to modernize the sexual assault
laws by making them gender neutral and by instituting a system of degrees by
91. See Eiscnstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438. 92 S. Ct. 1029, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.
Ct 1678 (1965).
92. United States v. Buck, 342 A.2d 48 (D.C. 1975) (If a right to privacy does encompass sodomy
between consenting male adults, sexual acts in public would not be included.), hereinafter "Buck".
93. United States v. McKean, 338 A.2d 439 (D.C. 1975) (The consentual sexual conduct occurred in
enclosed cubicals within a health club.), "hereinafter McKean".
94. D.C. CODE ANN § 22-3502(a), supra note 47 (1981).
95. Jenkins v. United States, 506 A.2d 1120 (D.C. 1986) (A person can only be guilty of a sexual
assault if the other person has not consented to the touching.); See also, McDermott v. United States, 98 A.2d
287, 289 (D.C. 1953).
96. Buck, supra note 92; McKean. supra note 93; United States v. Carson, 319 A.2d 329 (D.C. 1974);
Harris v. United States, 315 A.2d 569 (D.C. 1974) (en banc); Riley v. United States, 298 A.2d 228 (D.C
1972) (amended by Order, Feb. 20, 1973). See infra note 126, on jury nullification of charges in a 1993
consensual sodomy case.
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which charges would be made for various sex crimes." Among other things, the
Act included provisions to repeal the sodomy law outright"0 lower the age of

consent,

9

and reform many of the other sex crime laws which Congress had

imposed upon the District."'

VIII. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO D.C.'s 1981 REPEAL. IlNTATIVE
The hearings on the 1981 Act in the House of Representatives were fraught

with bitter disagreement over the right and the ability of D.C. residents to make
reasonable choices about their own moral code. The Chairman of the House

Committee on the District of Columbia, Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.),
championed this right and attempted to foreclose debate on the substance of the
Act by persuading his fellow Committee members that such matters were not
legitimately within the reach of the Committee, or of Congress as a body."10
Nonetheless, the bulk of the hearings were dominated by Committee members
who viewed District affairs as the Nation's affairs by definition. Citing the
District's special role as the Nation's Capital, and evoking the wishes of the
Founding Fathers of the Constitution, these members of Congress sent loud and
clear signals to their constituents about their positions on morality. 2 ' Not

97. D.C. Council Act 4-69. An Act in the Council of the District of Columbia, "District of Columbia
Sexual Assault Reform Act of 1981." D.C. Reg. 3409 (1981) ("1981 Act"). D.C. Act 4-69 was transmitted to
the house on July 21, 1981. Letter of Transmittal from D.C. Council Chairman Arrington Dixon to Thomas
O'Neill, Jr, Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Representatives, July 21. 1981.
98. 1981 Act, supra note 97. Section 13(b) "Section 104 of An Act To provide for the treatment of
sexual psychopaths in the District of Columbia and for other purposes, approved June 9. 1948 (62 Stat. 347:
D.C. CODE ANN, § 22-3502 is repealed.)
99. Id. § 5, "Unlawful Contact with a Child," lowered the age of consent to 16 years of age.
100. Id. § 13(a) "Repealer Provisions"
101. Hearings on H. Res. 208. "District of Columbia Sexual Assault Reform Act of 1981. before the
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the District of Columbia. 97th Cong., Ist Stss. (1981).
hereinafter, 1981 Hearings. Testimony of Chairman Ronald Dcllums:
Clearly what we are suggesting is that it is not our place here in the Congress of the United States, and
specifically in this committee, to address ourselves to any substantive questions of the act itself. Id., at 7.
I do not believe that it is either reasonable or fair to assume that the people of every jurisdiction except
the District of Columbia are capable of making prudent and moral decisions about their governance, and
that the Congress is the place to constantly try to prove this fallacy. Id. at 8.
102. Id. at 11. Statement of Rep. Thomas Bliley (R-Vazzzz):
The Law in such matters cannot be neutral. This act, by specifically legalizing unusual sexual
practices, would condone them.
The moral and ethical traditions of this Nation do not condone acts such as sodomy and adultery and
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surprisingly, among the most fervently-expressed sentiments were those on the
topic of sodomy, as practiced by homosexuals:
Who could possibly benefit from measures which sanction conduct none of us
consider acceptable? Homosexual activity and the seduction of children consensual or otherwise - are fundamentally, ethically and objectively
wrong. For this body to acquiesce in measures such as D.C. Act 4-69 which
legitimize such activity would be an abdication of our responsibility to the
citizens of this country - for what we condone here in the nation's capital
signals the rest of the country that such standards of conduct are and should
be acceptable elsewhere. The members of this Committee know full well that
their constituents would not condone these standards.103 Why then permit
their reign in the city which fully belongs to all Americans?'0 4
On October 1, 1981, the House of Representatives voted 281-199 to veto the
1981 Act.105 Only once prior to the 1981 Congressional Veto of the Sexual Assault
I do not believe that the people of America believe that they are acceptable and should be allowed by
laws in the Nation's Capital...
You have heard, and I am certain that you will continue to hear, many well-meaning people say that
they do not like all of the provisions of this act either, but that it is not our job to overturn a legally
adopted law in the District of Columbia.
I must point out that the District is a unique jurisdiction in American Government. The District of
Columbia is the Nation's Capital and was set up solely for that purpose by the Congress ...
The Founding Fathers clearly stated their desire for the Nation's Capital to be a special place and
for the final authority over it to rest with the people of the Nation through their elected representatives.
We, as Members of Congress, cannot and must not deny our constitutional responsibilities. We are
required to uphold the Constitution by our oath of office and I will not abrogate that oath and that
responsibility and allow the enactment of a law which I know to be wrong in the Nation's Capital. Id.
103. To the contrary, fully one half of the states in the nation did not have statutes criminalizing
sodomy at the time when the Reform Act of 1981 was being considered. Id. at 4.
104. Id. at 16. (Statement of Rep. Philip Crane (R-1ll)). He went on to say:
Mr. Chairman. I believe this course to be the appropriate one, because enactment of the proposal
would benefit no one, and in fact could harm many who would be adversely affected by its ill-considered

provision. It is not my intention to debate the moral implications of these shortcomings. Individual
conduct is not properly a concern of government unless that conduct harms others or deleteriously affects
the social order. There is little doubt that the proposals in question are unacceptably offensive on both
points.
For example, under the term of the proposal the maximum term for convictions in cases of forcible
rape would be reduced from possible life imprisonment to no more than 70 years. Penalties for sodomous
homosexual conduct and seduction of children currently contained in Sections 22-3502 and 22-3002 of
the D.C. CODE ANN. would, under Section 13 of D.C. Act 4-69, be completely eliminated - - thus making
such acts legal. Id.
105. The House of Representatives voted 281-199 on October 1, 1981, to veto Act 4-69. Cong. Record,
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Reform Act had Congress vetoed an act of the D.C. City Council.100 Clearly, if
the District wanted to rid itself of the spectre of a Congressionally-imposed and preserved sodomy law, it would have to take matters into its own hands on a local
level, rather than waiting for Congress to recognize the right of D.C. residents to
control their own affairs.

IX. HIATUS
A.

DURING WHICH SODOMY LAW CONTINUED TO STAND

Clarke v. United States

One of the first laws created by the new District of Columbia City Council was
the Human Rights Act, passed in 1973.17 The purpose of the Human Rights Act
was to eliminate "discrimination by reason of race, color, religion, national origin,
sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family
responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, physical handicap, source of
income and place of residence or business" in the District."0 a The only category
which led to a legal struggle between D.C. and Congress was that of sexual
orientation.
Georgetown University, located in the District and run by the Catholic Church,
refused to extend official recognition to its lesbian and gay student groups. These
groups brought suit against the University for sexual orientation discrimination
under the D.C. Human Rights Act.110 The D.C. Court of Appeals found that
Georgetown, despite its religious affiliation, was subject to the discrimination
prohibition.11 0 It held that, while Georgetown was not required under the Human
Rights Act to give official University recognition to the groups, it would have to

70
Oct. 1, 1981, p. . D.C. Reg. 4526 Oct. 23, 1981. "District o Columbia Sexual Assault Reform Act of
1981," "U.S House of Representatives Disapproved Act. No. 4-69. "District of Columbia Sexual Assault
Reform Act of 1981" on October 1, 1981. Act No. 4-69 was disapproved in accordance with Section 602
(c)(2) of the "District of Columbia Self Governmental Reorganization Act. H.R. 208.
106. See H. Con. Res. 228, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) vetoing D.C. Council Act 3-120, "Location of
Chanceries:' The Location of Chanceries Act was an attempt to zone the location o foreign chanceries within
the District. This was thought to be of Federal interest because the U.S. State Department handles dip!omatic
matters.
107. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 et seq. (§ 6-2201; Dec. 13. 1977, D.C. Law 2-38. title I. § 101) (1987
and Supp. 1989).
108. Id.
109. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University. 536 A.2d I (D.C. 1987) (cn bane).
110. Id.

330

SODOMY LAW REFORM

allow them equal access to facilities and services offered by the University."'1
In response, Congress passed an amendment ("Armstrong Amendment") to the
D.C. budget which prohibited access to any of the funds allocated to D.C. unless

the members of the City Council would pass an exemption to the Human Rights
Act for religiously-affiliated educational institutions." 2 This exemption was only to
apply to discrimination based on sexual orientation.113 Discrimination in all of the
other categories would still be illegal for religious schools.
The members of the City Council filed suit, in Clarke, et al. v. United States of
America, (Clarke), challenging Congress' authority to extort their votes on an
issue in exchange for federal funds. 11 ' The grounds for the suit were many, but

they succeeded on the argument that the Armstrong Amendment violated the
Council members' First Amendment free speech rights.lla The court found that:

Through the Home Rule Act, Congress has furnished the District with a
democratic form of government and vested the legislative power of this
government in the Council. Therefore, members of the Council are

Ill. Id. at 16-17.
112. 134 Cong. Rec. S9108 (daily ed. July 8, 1988) provided:
Sect. (a) This section may be cited as the "Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and Academic
Freedom Act."

(b) None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be obligated or expended after December 31, 1988,
if on that date the District of Columbia has not adopted subsection (c) of this section.
(c) Section 1-2520 of the District of Columbia Code (1981 edition) is now amended by adding after
subsection (2) the following subsection:
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of the laws of the District of Columbia. it shall not be an
unlawful discriminatory practice in the District of Columbia for any educational institution that is
affiliated with a religious organization or closely associated with the tenets of a religious organization to
deny. restrict, abridge, or condition(A) the use of any fund, service, facility, or benefit; or
(B) the granting of any endorsement, approval, or recognition, to any person or persons that are
organized for. or engaged in. promoting, encouraging or condoning any homosexual act, lifestyle,
orientation, or belief.
This amendment is known as the Armstrong Amendment, named after Senator Armstrong, who offered it in
the Senate.
113. Id. 59108 (c).
114. Clarke, et al. v. United States, 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 915 F.2d
699 D.C. Cir. 1990) [Hereinafter "Clarke"].
115. Id. The other grounds were "unconstitutional condition on a spending measure; as an
unconstitutional takings; establishment of religion; and as a violation of the speech and associational rights of
District residents who express a particular position on homosexuality." Id. at 409. Because the Circuit Court
found the Armstrong Amendment violated free speech rights, it did not examine any of the other causes of
action. Id. at 409, note 4.
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"legislators" in every traditional sense. As such, they enjoy broad First
Amendment protections in discharging their responsibilities.' 10
The court went on to say:
Unless and until Congress restructures the District government to divest the
Council of its legislative function, it must respect the broad First Amendment
rights that the Council members enjoy by virtue of their status as
legislators."'
Respecting D.C. Council members' free speech rights in this case meant that
Congress was required to use the least restrictive means necessary to provide the
religious exemption they sought. The court reasoned that since Congress had
retained authority to legislate directly for the District, it could have enacted
section (c) of the Armstrong Amendment itself, without holding City services
hostage. 18 Because the Armstrong Amendment was not the least restrictive means
for enacting the religious school exemption, it was unconstitutional. 1
B.

D.C.'s Subsequent Unsuccessful Reform Attempts

Subsequent to the Congressional veto of the 1981 Act, there were several
attempts to legalize consensual sodomy, both by citizens and by the City Council.
There were two voter initiatives which never made it to the ballot - one in 1986,
the other in 1992.220 For eight consecutive years following the Congressional veto
of the 1981 Act, bills were introduced in the D.C. City Council to reform the
sodomy law. Each time the bill was allowed to die in Committee. t 2 In 1991, an

116.

Id. at 410 (citations omitted).

117. Id.
118. Id. Congress did enact the legislation directly. D.C. Appropriations Act. 1990. Pub. L No. 101-68
§ 141, 103 Stat. 1267. 1284 (1989).
119. Id. at 417.
120. "D.C. Privacy Initiative Act of 1986." a voter initiative measure No. 22. The measure died without
making it to the ballot. Memorandum from Deborah George. Legislative Information Spocialist. Council of
the District of Columbia (Aug. 24. 1987) (on file with the author). The 1992 petition filed by Queer Nation.
National Capital. Sodomy Repeal Project was filed with the office of D.C. City Council Chairman John
Wilson. This petition did not make it to the ballot either.
121.

Lou Chibarro. Jr., Gays Expect The Worst For Sodomy BiII's Fate On Hill. The Wash. Blade,

May 7. 1993. P.. at p. 19. Wilhelmina J. Rolark. the Council member who chaired the Judiciary Committee
to which the bills were referred, would not bring the bills forward for a vote and they all died in committee.
Id. at page 19.
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additional reform bill was introduced.' 2 2 It also died in Committee.
C.

What Forces Made Reform Unnecessary

1. Order to Police Not to Enforce

While Congress was grandstanding on moral issues, the District government was
shackled with a law which its citizens, through their legislators, had made clear
they no longer wanted. In recognition of the fact that the prosecution of consensual
sodomy cases drained precious -District resources, the City took matters into its
own hands. City Administrator Robert Mallet instructed the Metropolitan Police
Department not to bring charges in consensual sodomy cases. 2 3 The resulting
124
police directive also gave low investigative priority to consensual sodomy cases.
122. Council of the District of Columbia Bill 9-79, "District of Columbia Criminal Code Right to
Privacy Amendment Act of 1991.":
Section 2. Section 104 of an Act To provide for the treatment of sexual psychopaths in the District
of Columbia and for other purposes, approved June 9, 1948 (62 Stat. 347;.DC CODE ANN, sec. 223502). is amended by adding a new subsection (c) to read as follows:
(c) No act engaged in only by consenting persons 16 years of age or older shall constitute offense
under this section.
123. Memorandum from Robert Mallet, City Administrator, (Feb. 19, 1992) to Isaac Fulwood, Chief.
Metropolitan Police Department, February 19, 1992, "Prioritizing MPD Resources/District Sodomy Laws."
This is to follow-up on our February 13 telephone conversation concerning the need to better direct
and apply MPD and court resources to the enormous problems presented by violent crime in our
community, and to not overcommit those scarce resources in connection with the filing of charges related
solely to unlawful sexual behavior. To this end, we agreed that a distinction should generally be made
between consensual and non-consensual sexual behavior. Furthermore, it would be rare that a case
involving only consensual behavior would warrant felony charges (which present the greatest burden to an
already overburdened judicial system). We agreed, therefore, on the following guidelines concerning the
bringing of sexually related charges:
1. Absent aggravating circumstances, charges should not be brought for violation of DC CODE ANN
Sec. 22-3502 (sodomy) for consensual activity by adults.
2. MPD should not change its existing policies concerning the bringing of charges for violations of D C
CODE ANN Sec. 22-3502 for non-consensual conduct or conduct involving minors.
3. Adult. consensual conduct violative of 22-3502 which is also violative of other criminal provisions such as 22-1112 (Lewd. indecent, or obscene acts) - should continue to be charges [sic], pursuant to
existing policy, under those other provisions..
124. Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C., Special Order 92.10 (June 19, 1992):
"The purpose of this special order is to apprise members of the policy and procedures when handling
violators of DC CODE ANN §22-3502 (Sodomy) and DC CODE ANN 22-1112 (Lewd, Indecent or
Obscene Acts).
In an effort to maintain appropriate enforcement of violations of D. C. Code §22-3502 (Sodomy) and
D C. CODE AN% §22-112 (Lewd, Indecent or Obscene Acts), members coming in contact with individuals
who may be involved in consensual activity of such nature shall adhere to the following procedures:
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2. Jury Nullification of Sodomy Prosecutions
Citizens of the District of Columbia also began to resent the fact that funds
were being wasted on the indictment and prosecution of consensual sodomy
charges. In one of the last cases prosecuted under the sodomy statute as enacted in
1948, two men were charged with engaging in oral sex in a parked car.'" The
U.S. Attorney refused to drop the charges. Jurors found the defendants not guilty,
and reportedly remarked upon the time and resources wasted on such cases.1 20

D.

Why Reform Was Still Necessary

Despite these phenomena, reform of the sodomy statute was still necessary. As
an administrative measure, the police directive could have been withdrawn at any
time. Defendants charged with sodomy, despite consent to the act, would have
their fates left up to the draw of the jury rolls. Indeed, even with a draw favorable
to them, there was the danger that some jurors would disqualify themselves
The charge of Sodomy may be placed only when these circumstances exists:
1. In all instances when force is used or consent of either party is absent.
2. In all cases involving juveniles.
3. When the offense is committed on public space or public property and in plain view.
All violations of Section 22-3502 (Sodomy) under circumstances not listed above shall be prosecuted
under D.C. CODE ANN. Section 22-112 [sic) (Lewd, Indecent or Obscene Acts). When circumstances dictate
charges pursuant of Section 22-3502. an official of the member's unit shall respond to the scene for final
approval.
Members receiving complaints of offenses in progress in ABC or other licensed commercial
establishments shall immediately investigate and coordinate with the Narcotics and Special Investigation
Division (SID). Members receiving telephone complaints of ongoing violations within ABC or other licensed
commercial establishments shall refer these matters to the Prostitution, Gambling and Liquor Unit. SID. for
any investigative or enforcement action. Under no circumstances shall any member apply for or execute a
warrant in any such establishment without the express approval of the Commander. Special Investigative
Branch, SID.
This was a reiteration of the official policy of the D.C. government to decline to make arrests for private
consensual acts of sodomy first adopted in 1973. District of Columbia Office of the Corporation Counsel
Written Testimony in support of D.C. Council Bill 10-30, "D.C. Criminal Code Right to Privacy Amendment
Act of 1993," January 28, 1993.
125. Both of the men so engaged were charged under the statute. Under the 1948 Act both parties in
consensual sodomy could be charged. As late as 1993. the practice of the United States Attorney for D.C. was
to charge both parties to a consentual act of sodomy. See Infra note 126.
126. Jury 'Nullifies' Sodomy Charge Against Gay Afen, Wash. Blade, Aug. 27. 1993 at 15. Jury
nullification is an acquittal by the jury even though they believe the defendant has committed the offense
charged. The two men were charged with having oral sex in a parked car. Nine prospectivc jurors disqualified
themselves because they could not convict for consensual sex acts between adults. One juror reported that
after hearing the case, all but one of the twelve thought the case was a waste of resources.
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12 7
because they would not convict for consensual sexual acts between adults.
Further, the residents of the District of Columbia had never decided for
themselves to adopt a law criminalizing consensual sodomy. Indeed, they had
strongly declared that they did not want this to be a crime in 1981, and nearly
every year thereafter. To have the law remain on the books was offensive to their
right to rule themselves.
In addition, the Metropolitan Police Department is not the only police force
operating within the District of Columbia. There are also the Capitol Police, and
the various park and service police agencies. The MPD Directive had no effect on
the ability or zeal of enforcement of these other police agencies. Once arrested by
the Park Police, for example, prosecutorial discretion remains with the U.S.
Attorney.

X. THE DISTRIcT's SUCCESSFUL REFORM OF THE SODOMY LAW

Renewed motivation for a reform of the District's sodomy law came in 1992,
after a raid by police of a gay club in Southeast D.C., in which 14 people were
arrested on charges of sodomy. In a further push for reform developed once
incumbent Councilmembers Wilhelmina J. Rolark and H.R. Crawford, were
defeated in the 1992 election. Both defeated Councilmembers strongly opposed
sodomy law reform. 1 8
A public hearing was held on Friday, January 29, 1993, in Council Chambers of
The District Building, in order to hear testimony from organizations and
individuals concerning the merits of the latest reform bill. Several citizens and
emissaries from local churches condemned the immorality of sodomy and the
destructive behavior it would inevitably lead to.
Overwhelmingly, though, the sentiment was in favor of the reform measure.
Testimony in support of reform came from a wide variety of organizations,
including Queer Nation, the ACLU, Lambda Rising, ACT UP, and the Gertrude
Stein Democratic Club, as well as from private citizens. 28 These witnesses shared
poignant and personal stories of how the sodomy law adversely affected their selfesteem and feelings of well-being, as well as the social climate of the District. 8 0 In
127. Id.
128. Rene Sanchez, D.C. Repeals Sodomy Law Gay-Rights ActivistsPraise Council Vote, Wash. Post,
April 8. 1993 at A1. A18.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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addition to decrying Congress' well-documented bigotry on this issue, they

denounced the sodomy law as arbitrarily enforced, a waste of money, a bar to
privacy and freedom of religious expression, and as a disincentive for persons
seeking treatment for AIDS and other sexually-transmitted diseases.18'
In 1993, the D.C. City Council passed the Right to Privacy Amendment Act of
1993, ("Reform Act")13 2 reforming the sodomy law so that it no longer applied to
consensual acts of sodomy between participants who were at least 16 years old.a
The effect of the Act was to keep sodomy involving minors a felony,'" while

consenting adults caught practicing sodomy in a public place could only be
charged with obscenity or indecent exposure, both of which are misdemeanors.aza
Surprisingly, Congress took no action whatsoever to obstruct the passage of the
Reform Act. No hearings were held or even requested, and no sentiments of moral
outrage and revulsion were debated for the record. Instead, the Reform Act was
transmitted by the Chairman of the D.C. City Council, noted in the House record,
and quietly allowed to pass into law.130
131. See transcripts of D.C. City Council Judiciary Committee Hearing. Friday, January 29, 1993.
Council Chambers, The District Building.
132. "Right to Privacy Amendment Act of 1993," D.C. Reg. 6836 (1993). Pursuant to Section 412 of
the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, P. L 93-198. "the Act".
the Council of the District of Columbia adopted Bill No. 10-30 on first and second reading. April 7. 1993. and
May 4, 1993. respectively. Following the signature of the Mayor on May 5. 1993. this legislation was assigned
Act No. 10-23, published in the May 14, 1993, edition of the D.C. Register. (Vol. 40 page 3007) and
transmitted to Congress on May 6, 1993, for a 60.day review, in accordance with Section 602 (c)(2) of the
Act.
The Council of the District of Columbia hereby gives notice that the 60-day Congressional Review Period
has expired, and therefore, cites this enactment as D.C. Law 10-14, effective September 14, 1993.
133. Id. The purpose of the Act was:
to amend the District of Columbia Criminal Code to eliminate criminal sanctions for certain private,
consensual, non-commercial sexual acts between persons who are above the existing age of consent in
order to affirm the right to privacy and to reduce discrimination.
Sec. 2. Section 104 of An Act To provide for the treatment of sexual psychopaths in the District of
Columbia and for other purposes, approved June 9, 1948 (62 Stat. 347; DC CODE ANN § 22-3502). is
amended by adding a new subsection (c) to read as follows:
(c) No act engaged in only by consenting persons 16 years of age or older shall constitute an offense
under this section. Id.
134. Originally, several members of the D.C. City Council had resisted approal of the Act in
opposition to the age of majority being set at 16. However, because 16 is the age or majority to consent to
other sexual acts in the District, these members eventually capitulated, rather than endorsing a provision
which would be discriminatory on its face. D.C. Repeals Sodomy Law Gay Rights Activists Praise Council
Vote, Wash. Post, April 8, 1993, at Al, A18.
135. Rene Sanchez, D.C. Repeals Sodomy Law Gay-Rights Activists PraiseCouncil Vote, Wash. Post,
April 8. 1993. at AI, A18.
136. 139 Cong. Rec. H2425-06 (1993).
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XI.

CONGRESSIONAL PURSE STRINGS AND THE CONTROL OF THE DISTRICr'S

MORALITY

A.

Formulafor the District of Columbia's Appropriation of Federal Funds

Each year, the District of Columbia receives from the Federal government a
sum of money which helps to fund the operations of the D.C. government. This
sum is calculated by means of a formula, expressed as a percentage of the local
revenues of the District during an earlier year. For example, the federal
appropriation for the District for fiscal year 1994 is equal to 24 percent of the local
revenues for fiscal year 1992.137
B. Congress' General Control Over District Finances and Morals
In the five years between 1987 and 1992, Congress exerted its right to control
the manner in which the District of Columbia spent its money more than it did
during the previous fourteen years since the enactment of Home Rule.1 30 This
dominion attached itself to an unusual variety of issues, from civil rights for
homosexuals and the death penalty to carpooling and football.130
Once again, members of Congress justified the exertion of their control over the
District by asserting the rights of all citizens of the nation to control what
activities took place in the District, by virtue of D.C.'s role as the Nation's
Capital, or simply by the fact that it serves as a popular tourist attraction.1 40 Such
137. Under this provision. "local revenues" refers to "the independently audited revenues of the District
of Columbia that are derived from sources other than the Federal Government during that year..." DC
CODE ANN. § 47-3406.1 (1981).
138. Betsy Dance, House Rules: How Congress Plays With The District, Wash. Post, Oct. 4, 1992, at
Cl, [hereinafter "Dance"]:
Thus Congress has, when it chooses to exercise it, supreme authority over how the city spends its money
and makes its laws. And according to the Brookings Institution's Kent Weaver, a veteran student or
D.C.'s congressional relations, Congress has flexed that muscle more in the past five years than since
home rule began. Id.
139. Kent Jenkins, Jr., Congress and Bush Are Making a Federal Case Out of Local Affairs, Wash.
Post, Sept. 27, 1992, at BI.
"So far this year, either Congress or Bush has been involved in at least a dozen local issues." Id.
140. Id.
"'We have got to leave our homes and come here to work and deal with the nation's visitors who
come here,' said Rep. Tom DeLay (R-Tex.). *That's paramount, not Mayor (Sharon Pratt) Kelly's office
or any other office.'" Id.
"Sometimes (lawmakers) are out to make a national statement. And sometimes the matters arc so
pedestrian, so petty.' [Rep. Ronald V.] Dellums (D-Calif.) said. 'With some of these guys you have to
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rationalizations have prompted numerous observations by city politicians, citizens,
and the media, that such disingenuous statements seem to belie more self-serving
impulses:
[S]ince home rule divided power between D.C. and the Congress,
Hill's meddling in District affairs tends to come in two general
generally ignoble - categories: symbolic grandstanding to achieve
ends in the member's home district and petty micromanagement that
small, usually privileged constituency here in the District.14 '

Capitol
- and
political
serves a

C. Congress' Battle With the District Over Abortion Funding
In 1988, Congress forbad the District from using its own local tax revenues to
fund abortions for poor women in the District. Until October, 1993, when
Congress approved a $3.4 billion budget for the District and the ban was finally
lifted, this restriction made the District "the only place in the country where it was
against federal law to use local tax money for abortions."" 2 D.C. officials called
Congress' relaxed restrictions on abortion funding a major victory for Home Rule
14
in D.C. 3
Still, the battle to win independence from Congress on this issue had not come
quickly or easily. Bitter debates on the floor of the House opened old wounds and
sparked a reiteration of aspersions against the District as well as a new round of
speculations about the motivations of some members of Congress:
The debate in the House yesterday was peppered with disparaging references
to the District Government, with one member urging the House to abolish
home rule and assume direct control over District's municipal affairs. But
lawmakers who supported the budget argued that the District government
should be allowed to decide how to spend local tax money.
All fifty state governments are free to make decisions on abortion funding,
they said, and the District should have the same right.
wonder what in the hell else do they do?" Id.
141. Dance, supra note 138.
142. Amy Goldstein. DC Delays Spending on Abortions. Health Officials* Plan Would Limit Funding
for Indigent Women. Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 1994, at Al.
143. Leonard Hughes. Hamil Harris, End of Abortion Ban Draws Fire. Praise, All Eyes Are on Kelly
After Congress Lifts Prohibition on Publicly Financed Operations. Wash. Post. Nov., 4. 1993. at it.
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Rep. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.) said he had supported previous efforts to
prevent federal funds from paying for abortions, but chastised lawmakers for
injecting themselves too much in city affairs. "'Why is it that some members
are on their high moral horse here when it comes to the District of
Columbia?' he asked. 'Is it because there are so many African Americans in
the city?' he asked. 'Is it because there are so many Democrats? ... I will
believe in (opponents') sincerity when they apply the same standard in their
14
home states.' '

D. Domestic Partnershipas the Gay Issue of the 1990's
Recently, the forefront of the battle for lesbian and gay rights has moved
beyond initiatives to modernize sex crime laws and create municipal nondiscrimination ordinances. Activists are now pushing for civil laws which will
afford protection and allow greater participation in society by lesbians and gay
men through Domestic Partnership laws. These laws are generally municipal
ordinances which allow two adults to register with the city as Domestic Partners
unmarried, " " residing together, in a committed relationship, and sharing living
expenses.
Domestic partnership laws offer the most tangible benefits when one of the
partners is a municipal employee. Such employees, having registered or signed
some other sworn statement that they meet the qualifications, are then allowed to
have their partner receive health insurance under their employment policy.140 By
March, 1992, Domestic Partnership laws, or policies, allowing employees to receive
health benefits were in place or under consideration, in Seattle, Washington; New
York City, New York; San Francisco, California; Delaware (state personnel); Ann
Arbor, Michigan; and Takoma Park, Maryland; among many others.14 7 That this

144. Kent Jenkins, Jr.. 3.4 Billion DC Budget Is Enacted. Plan Allows City to Fund Abortionsfor Poor
Women, Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1993, Al.
145. Marriage licenses for unions between persons of the same gender are not issued by any state.
See
Peter Guthrie. Marriage Between Persons of The Same Sex, 63 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1993). Hawaii is the only
state were a court has ruled that prohibition may violate the State Constitution's guarantee against
discrimination on the basis of sex. Baehr, et al. v. Lewin. 852 P.2d 44 (Ha. 1993).
146. Of course, the benefit to the employee is not tax deductible. Thus, regardless of whether the
employee pays the premium for the Partner, or the municipality pays the same contribution it does for legally
married couples, the employee will still be taxed on the benefit as if it were income.
147. 1992 D.C. Appropriations Bill 138 Cong. Rec. S10879-01. The list named thirty-seven entitles as
of March. 1992, which either had in place, or were considering the adoption of Domestic Partnership policies.
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diverse geographical and political spectrum had already considered Domestic
Partnership policies as acceptable and necessary to affect justice in their own
communities did not sway Congress' desire to seize on this issue when it arose in
D.C., and to claim it a moral issue unacceptable to the American people. 1 "0
E. Congress's Refusal to Fund the District's Domestic PartnershipAct

Congressional control of the District's financial affairs, and its attendant control
over D.C.'s social affairs, soon made a target of the Health Benefits Extension Act
of 1992 ("Domestic Partnership Act"). 149 This Act allowed two persons over the
age of eighteen who were in a "committed relationship" to register as "Domestic
Partners" with the City.150 Also included in the Act were hospital visitation
rights,""1 funeral, maternity, paternity, and sick leave' 52 for Domestic Partners.
City employees would have the right to purchase family medical insurance with
the City Employees Health Benefits Plan at their own cost. 1 3 Private companies
who offered health benefits to their employees under the Act would be eligible for
tax benefits. 15
In 1992, and again in 1993, Congress was asked to approve a D.C. budget which
included a provision to fund the Domestic Partnership Act. Federal funds were not
sought to finance the benefits themselves, but were required under the Act to cover
the costs of administration of the program. Federal funds were also called for in
the form of federal tax breaks to private employers.
Congressional response to these requests fell mainly within three camps.

148. 139 Cong. Rec. S9501-01, (1993). (Statement of Senator Trent Lott (R-La)) referring to
Domestic Partnership legislation in D.C. as -normalizing instability and changing the family unit.Statement of Senator Trent Lott (R-La):
Mr. President, first of all, with regard to the home rule question, this is the District of Columbia. but it is
also our Nation's Capital. It is a fact that what happens here goes way beyond just the city of the District
of Columbia. It does affect our entire Nation. We put a lot of money into this city and there are very
serious legal questions that are raised by this policy. This is a new policy that does not just affect the
District of Columbia. It could very well affect Wisconsin. North Carolina. Nevada. and any other state.
Is this the kind of thing we want to start, not only in the District of Columbia, but, yes, in Jackson. MS,
and San Francisco, CA? This is a policy that goes way beyond home rule and way beyond this city, our
Nation's Capital. This is a new policy that will have much broader ramifications. Id.
149. D.C CODE ANN. § 36-104 et seq. (D.C. Law 9-114, § 2, 39 D.C. Reg. 2861).
150. Id. § 36-1402.
151. Id. § 36-1404.
152. Id. § 36-1405
153. Id. § 36-1406.
154. Id. DC CODE ANN. § 36-1401, DC CODE ANN § 47-1803.3.
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Representing what was clearly the minority view, Senator Herb Kohl (D-Wisc.)
invoked the doctrine of Home Rule as a bar to debating the substantive merits of
the Act. He asserted that Congress could legitimately cast a symbolic vote by
means of withholding federal funds, but that the nullification of local laws was not
the role of the federal government. 155 His colleague in the House, Representative
Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.), charged his fellow Congressional members with
cowardice and insincerity:
[T]o attempt to use a piece of legislation dealing with the District of
Columbia to address what otherwise one is not willing or capable of
addressing at the national level, because the citizenry of the District of
Columbia cannot vote for or against one, I would suggest is an absurd act. In
this gentleman's opinion it lacks courage and it lacks dignity. It lacks respect
for the rights and the prerogatives of people in this District who are also
Americans. The Members do not attempt to raise these questions at the city
council and the mayors' levels of the communities in which they serve.150
Others, like Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.), were of the opinion
that Congress was entitled to take this opportunity to oversee the District's choices
for its citizens, as a quid pro quo for dispensing federal funds:
Mr. Chairman, the District of Columbia seems to want to have it all. On one
hand, they want complete autonomy over their own affairs, even to the point
of statehood, if possible.
On the other hand, they argue that they are entitled to almost unlimited
amounts of Federal funds above and beyond what any city, county or State in

155. 139 Cong. Rec. S9501-01, supra note 148, (Statement of Senator Herb Kohl (D. WI)):
The denial of Federal funds makes a symbolic statement. It says the Federal Government does not
endorse the policies of the District. Invalidating laws, however, makes a different statement. It says that
the District Government is exercising its power at the pleasure of the Congress rather than its own
citizens, and that, Mr. President, is not consistent with home rule.
156. 138 Cong. Rec. H6120-02 (1993). Interestingly, during his soliloquy, Representative Dellums took
a page from his ideological opponents, who often raise the special role of the District of Columbia as a reason
why Congress has unique license to control local laws pertaining to morality and the image of the nation.
Representative Dellums went on to argue:
Why the District of Columbia? We should be a beacon of light to the world. We should be showing
the world, trying to emerge and embrace the principles of democracy that we believe in in [sicl this
country, even in the District of Columbia. and that we believe in the people's right to even disagree with
us.
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our Nation is eligible to receive. My colleagues should understand that the
District of Columbia is eligible for each and every Federal program any city,
county or State in this country is eligible for - in addition to the S700
million of Federal payment provided by this bill.... Mr. Chairman, I will be
showing my support for home rule today in my votes.. . But I would also ask
the representative of this city to understand that they cannot keep expecting

to receive ever increasing amounts of Federal largesse while insisting that the
Congress keep its nose out of city business.1"'
Others in Congress denied that the monetary effects of the Domestic
Partnership Act would be significant, instead flatly proclaiming the issue to be one
about the effects of "redefining the family" and "normalizing instability."1tea This
appears to be the most truthful assessment of Congress' attitude with regard to the
Domestic Partnership provision, for there is no mistaking that the majority of
those who spoke during the hearings in both houses of Congress, inboth years, saw
this as a moral, rather than a financial issue.'50 As was true of prior Congressional
hearings on morality legislation, some members of Congress insisted on invoking
the role of Washington, D.C. as the Nation's Capital, in order to block an
initiative with which tourists to D.C. might feel uncomfortable.100 Others had
139 Cong. Rec. H4336-02 (1993) (statement of Rep. Dana Rohrabachcr (R.Calif.).
139 Cong. Rec. S9501-01 (1993) (statement of Senator Trent Lott (R-La)The D.C. Domestic Act is not about the expansion of health benefits Of the 38.000 full-time D.C.
city employees, only 3,500 would be eligible. Of that 3,500. the District government estimates that only
50 to 100 would actually receive health benefits as a result of the Domestic Partners Act.
So it is something much broader than making these health benefits available that is involved %4ith
this issue. The bill is intended as a means to officially recognize and sanction homosexual unions and
cohabitation outside of marriage. The Domestic Partners Act came as a direct result of a D.C. judges
decision not to grant a marriage license to homosexual couples.
In summary, this act has nothing to do with health care and everything todo sith redefinition of
family. It is about normalizing instability and changing the family unit.
159. 139 Cong. Rec. S9501-01 (1993) (statement of Senator Lott):
There are those who might say, 'Well, this is something that really should be left up to the District
of Columbia.' Yet, we have previously acted when other States may be affected by D.C. actions. So there
is nothing new about this. We have done it in terms of gun control. We had the Shelby amendment last
year on this same bill. Where there is a national issue or where there is a broader financial or overriding
moral issue, we have spoken before.
160. 139 Cong. Rec H4336-02 (1993) (statement of Rep. Ernest Istook (R-Ok.)):
[Domestic Partner legislation] is a mechanism whereby the District intends to permit homosexual
couples, as well as heterosexual couples who are not married, to register, in essence, with their partner
and establish certain legal advantages for themselves. It is something that these pcop!e who come to visit
Washington. DC. would not support, would not appreciate the Congress of the United States permitting
to remain on the books as an enactment that has any authority.
157.
158.
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more personal objections to the substance of the Act, and made the price of that
displeasure palpably clear:
I absolutely disagree with homosexuality and lesbianism. . . I feel equally
bad at all the heterosexual shacking-up we've got going on, which this law
would promote. This is just a terrible piece of legislation. They'll have a hell
of a hard time becoming a state if they keep passing legislation like this.10 1
In both 1992 and 1993, Congress soundly denied the District's efforts to fund its
Domestic Partnership Act.16 2 Not only had Congress declined to allow any federal
funds to be used for this purpose, it had in fact declared that D.C. was prohibited
from using any of its own money to effectuate the provisions of the Act. Even in a
year when the long-standing Congressional ban on abortion in the District was
lifted, Domestic Partnership had been easily defeated. 63 Anti-gay sentiment was
running at a fever pitch in Congress,'" with no sign of improvement on the
horizon.

161. Kent Jenkins, Jr., D.C. Partners Law Under Fire on Hill Measure Could Set Gay Rights
Precedent, Wash. Post, May 21, 1992, at C5. Rep. Clyde Holloway (R-La.) sponsored legislation to repeal the
law. The request to debate the provision was made by Rep. Holloway, but the House voted 231 to 181 not to
debate. Kent Jenkins, Jr., D.C. Budget Advances Partnership Law Intact, Wash. Post, July 9, 1992, at B5.
162. On July 30, 1992, the Senate voted 51 to 41 on the District's Appropriations Bill for fiscal year
1993. to prohibit funding of the Act. 138 Cong. Rec. S10876-01 (1992).
The House of Representatives followed suit on September 24, 1992, by a vote of 235 to 173. See 138
Cong. Rec. H9356-03 (1993).
On June 30, 1993, the House of Representatives again prohibited funding of the Act in the 1994 fiscal
year budget, by a vote of 255 to 171. 139 Cong. Rec. H4336-02 (1993).
On July 27, 1993, the Senate endorsed this measure, by a vote of 55 to 43. 139 Cong. Rec. S9501-01
(1993).
163. Kent Jenkins, Jr., D.C. Funding of Abortion Passes Senate. 'Domestic Partners'Only Loss as
1994 Budget Sails Through, Wash. Post, July 28, 1993, at Al.
D.C.'s budget sailed through the Senate with surprisingly little negative commentary about the District,
and with no opposition from abortion opponents. Only the provision on Domestic Partnership was dereated.
164. Kent Jenkins, Jr., D.C. Budget Passes In House by 2 Votes. City Funding for Abortions Is
Included, Wash. Post. July I. 1993. at Al. The Domestic Partner program was taken out of last year's budget
before the November election, but the measure lost by an even bigger margin this time, 251-177.
Rep. Ernest Istook. Jr. (R-Okla.) called the program 'the equivalent of gay marriage.' [D.C.
Delegate Eleanor Holmes] Norton said afterward that the vote showed that anti-gay sentiment has
coalesced across the nation. 'You are getting all these anti-gay referendums that are springing up
everywhere.' Norton said. 'Whatever this is, it is sending signals to members of the House: "vote against
gays." I was surprised the margin was this large.' Id.
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F. Local Efforts to Effectuate the District's Domestic Partnership Act
Congress can stop funds from effectuating the District of Columbia's Domestic
Partnership Act, but it cannot stop the United States' Postal Service. District
residents soon learned that they were still welcome to register themselves as
Domestic Partners, by sending a Declaration of Domestic Partnership form to the
Director of the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs in D.C. By
mailing the form by Certified mail/Return Receipt Requested, the couple would
get an official, albeit not terribly fancy, certificate as evidence of their Partnership.
The Declarations are housed in a drawer somewhere in the D.C.R.A., creating a
registry of sorts.265 Neither federal nor local funds are expended toward this end,
thus no act of Congress has been violated.
Certainly the couples who go to this effort do not receive any tangible benefits in
return. What they do get is the hope that some day the Domestic Partnership Act
may be funded, allowing the city and participating employers to extend benefits to
the registrants. In the meantime, declaring one's Domestic Partnership provides a
psychological lift by allowing a couple to proclaim, in the face of government and
societal hostility, their love and commitment toward one another.
Moreover, same-sex couples in the District, and elsewhere, have taken it upon
themselves to do unofficially what no state has yet allowed them to do officially marry each other and form families together. 0 0 More and more, lesbian and gay
couples are taking this matter into their own hands, much as the members of
Congress who eviscerated D.C.'s Domestic Partnership Act feared, and again
without accruing any tangible profit. Clearly, these couples derive an emotional
and communal benefit from such unions that will not be denied by legislators.
Furthermore, in light of how the District government and citizens took an active
role in nullifying the effects of the sodomy law following the unsuccessful attempts
at its reform, we foresee new developments to overcome the barriers Congress has
165. Because no funds are authorized to be spent on formal record.keeping. the exact location of such
Declarations is unknown.
166. Announcements of gay and lesbian Commitment Celebrations and Holy Unions are published
weekly, or near weekly, in the Washington Blade, a local newspaper serving the gay and lesbian community in
the D.C. area. See e.g., Wash. Blade, May 21. 1993; Wash. Blade, June 4, 1993 at 27; Wash. Blade Sept. 24.
1993 at 37. See also Wash. Blade, April 30. 1993 at 19 (describing "The Wedding.- a demonstration and
.massive, non-sectarian ceremony of commitment" among gay and lesbian participants in the 1993 National
March on Washington for Lesbian, Gay and Bi Equal Rights and Liberation. More than 2,100 couples were
officially registered to take part in "The Wedding," but significantly more, possibly as many as 4.000 couples.
participated in the April 24, 1993 celebration. Over 1.000 couples had been joined in union at a similar
ceremony as part of a smaller March on Washington in 1987.).
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mounted to Domestic Partnership rights. Most notably, we anticipate that more
aggressive attacks may be waged on employers in the District, 67 requiring them to
extend health and other benefits to Domestic Partners under two sections of the
D.C. Human Rights Law: prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and marital status.168
Basing a lawsuit against an employer on a combination of these provisions of the
D.C. Human Rights Law would be a bold move toward equalizing the benefits
that lesbian and gay couples obtain in comparison to those received by
heterosexual couples. Moreover, a growing number of state and local jurisdictions
are granting health benefits to same-sex couples, 1 69 and there is winning precedent
for suits against employers under human rights ordinances. In Minneapolis, for
example, three lesbian employees of the local library filed suit against the city for
failing to extend benefits to their partners.1 7 0 They won the first round of litigation
in 1992, when the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission ruled that they had been
discriminated against, in violation of a local human rights ordinance. The city was
17 1
ordered to pay the women $90,000, as well as $50,000 in attorneys' fees.
Subsequently, the city filed an appeal to the decision.1 7 2 However, the case was
settled when the Minneapolis City Council voted on August 27, 1993, to extend
health benefits to the partners of all lesbian' and gay city employees, effective
January 1994, and the library board voted to extend benefit coverage to the samesex partners of its employees.1 7 3 These victories, and the recent inclusion of
lesbians and gay men as a protected class under state civil rights legislation, have
prompted a chain-reaction by others in Minnesota to push for similar measures by

167. Human Rights Law covers all discrimination related to employment in D.C., even ifthe job
application and discriminatory decision were made outside the District. Green v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 704 F.
Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1988).
168. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501, 1-2512(a)(1).
169. William Murphy. City OKs Benefits to Gays, N.Y. Newsday, Oct. 30, 1993, at 5 ("The Dinkins
administration has reached tentative agreement with municipal unions to provide domestic partnership
benefits, such as health insurance, for homosexual city employees."). Eric Siegel, Baltimore Grants Benefits to
Gays, Baltimore Morning Sun. Dec. 16, 1993, at IA ("Domestic partners of gay and lesbian Baltimore
municipal workers will be eligible for health benefits under a new policy approved yesterday making the city
one of a growing number of municipalities to recognize homosexual unions.").
170. Jim Parsons. Board Extends Benefits to Gay Partners, Minneapolis Star Trib., Dec. 16, 1993, at
4B [hereinafter "Parsons"l.
171. Id.
172. Patricia Lopez Baden, Gay. Lesbian Partners to Get Health Benefits, Minneapolis Star Trib., Aug.
28, 1993, at IA [hereinafter "Lopez Baden"].
173. Parsons, supra note 170.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

345

their employers."7 4

XIL

CONCLUSION

September 14, 1993, marked'an important event in the history of Washington,
D.C. On that date the City Council won its long-fought battle with Congress over
the sodomy law that had been imposed on District residents forty-five years earlier.
This victory was an important step toward a fuller realization of the principles of
Home Rule, and a reminder of the inequity of a national body imposing its will on
a small community, over matters of purely local significance.
But Congressional oversight over District affairs has been democracy in slow
motion, especially for members of the lesbian and gay communities of D.C., for
whom reform of the sodomy law was most crucial. Lesbians and gay men strive for
bigger and better victories than simply having their sexual practices decriminalized
- - they yearn to express their love and their humanity safely in society, while
protecting themselves and their families against illness, discrimination, and
isolation, just as straight people do. The history of sodomy law reform in the
District serves as a reminder that D.C. residents as individuals hold the power to
aggressively push the limits of existing laws, and that they as a community must
take necessary measures to protect and advance their own local interests, despite
the constraints that Congress would impose upon them.

174. Lopez Baden. supra note 172.
"Dr. Marjorie Cowmeadow. an associate dean at the University of Minnesota and chairwoman of a
university committee on Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Concerns.
[said) her committee will ask the Board of
Regents to extend similar benefits to university employees"

